d4rtht3ll3ctus' root vault

Attacking Thick Client Applications

7 min read

Thick client applications are the applications that are installed locally on our computers. Unlike thin client applications that run on a remote server and can be accessed through the web browser, these applications do not require internet access to run, and they perform better in processing power, memory, and storage capacity. Thick client applications are usually applications used in enterprise environments created to serve specific purposes. Such applications include project management systems, customer relationship management systems, inventory management tools, and other productivity software. These applications are usually developed using Java, C++, .NET, or Microsoft Silverlight.

A critical security measure that, for example, Java has is a technology called sandbox. The sandbox is a virtual environment that allows untrusted code, such as code downloaded from the internet, to run safely on a user’s system without posing a security risk. In addition, it isolates untrusted code, preventing it from accessing or modifying system resources and other applications without proper authorization. Besides that, there are also Java API restrictions and Code Signing that helps to create a more secure environment.

In a .NET environment, a thick client, also known as a rich client or fat client, refers to an application that performs a significant amount of processing on the client side rather than relying solely on the server for all processing tasks. As a result, thick clients can provide a better performance, more features, and improved user experiences compared to their thin client counterparts, which rely heavily on the server for processing and data storage.

Some examples of thick client applications are web browsers, media players, chatting software, and video games. Some thick client applications are usually available to purchase or download for free through their official website or third-party application stores, while other custom applications that have been created for a specific company, can be delivered directly from the IT department that has developed the software. Deploying and maintaining thick client applications can be more difficult than thin client applications since patches and updates must be done locally to the user’s computer. Some characteristics of thick client applications are:

  • Independent software.
  • Working without internet access.
  • Storing data locally.
  • Less secure.
  • Consuming more resources.
  • More expensive.

Security Issues:

  • Improper Error Handling.
  • Hardcoded sensitive data.
  • DLL Hijacking.
  • Buffer Overflow.
  • SQL Injection.
  • Insecure Storage.
  • Session Management.

Information Gathering

In this step, penetration testers have to identify the application architecture, the programming languages and frameworks that have been used, and understand how the application and the infrastructure work. They should also need to identify technologies that are used on the client and server sides and find entry points and user inputs. Testers should also look for identifying common vulnerabilities like the ones we mentioned earlier at the end of the About section. The following tools will help us gather information.

|CFF Explorer|Detect It Easy|Process Monitor|Strings|

Client Side attacks

Although thick clients perform significant processing and data storage on the client side, they still communicate with servers for various tasks, such as data synchronization or accessing shared resources. This interaction with servers and other external systems can expose thick clients to vulnerabilities similar to those found in web applications, including command injection, weak access control, and SQL injection

Sensitive information like usernames and passwords, tokens, or strings for communication with other services, might be stored in the application’s local files. Hardcoded credentials and other sensitive information can also be found in the application’s source code, thus Static Analysis is a necessary step while testing the application. Using the proper tools, we can reverse-engineer and examine .NET and Java applications including EXE, DLL, JAR, CLASS, WAR, and other file formats. Dynamic analysis should also be performed in this step, as thick client applications store sensitive information in the memory as well.

|Ghidra|IDA|OllyDbg|Radare2| |dnSpy|x64dbg|JADX|Frida|

Network Side Attacks

Penetration testers that are performing traffic analysis on thick client applications should be familiar with tools like:

|Wireshark|tcpdump|TCPView|Burp Suite|

Server Side Attacks

Server-side attacks in thick client applications are similar to web application attacks, and penetration testers should pay attention to the most common ones including most of the OWASP Top Ten.

Retrieving hardcoded Credentials from Thick-Client Applications

Exploring the NETLOGON share of the SMB service reveals RestartOracle-Service.exe among other files. Downloading the executable locally and running it through the command line, it seems like it does not run or it runs something hidden.

C:\Apps>.\Restart-OracleService.exe
C:\Apps>

Downloading the tool ProcMon64 from SysInternals and monitoring the process reveals that the executable indeed creates a temp file in C:\Users\Matt\AppData\Local\Temp.

In order to capture the files, it is required to change the permissions of the Temp folder to disallow file deletions. To do this, we right-click the folder C:\Users\Matt\AppData\Local\Temp and under Properties → Security → Advanced → cybervaca → Disable inheritance → Convert inherited permissions into explicit permissions on this object → Edit → Show advanced permissions, we deselect the Delete subfolders and files, and Delete checkboxes.

Finally, we click OK → Apply → OK → OK on the open windows. Once the folder permissions have been applied we simply run again the Restart-OracleService.exe and check the temp folder. The file 6F39.bat is created under the C:\Users\cybervaca\AppData\Local\Temp\2. The names of the generated files are random every time the service is running.

Listing the content of the 6F39 batch file reveals the following.

@shift /0
@echo off
 
if %username% == matt goto correcto
if %username% == frankytech goto correcto
if %username% == ev4si0n goto correcto
goto error
 
:correcto
echo TVqQAAMAAAAEAAAA//8AALgAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA > c:\programdata\oracle.txt
echo AAAAAAAAAAgAAAAA4fug4AtAnNIbgBTM0hVGhpcyBwcm9ncmFtIGNhbm5vdCBiZSBydW4g >> c:\programdata\oracle.txt
<SNIP>
echo AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA >> c:\programdata\oracle.txt
 
echo $salida = $null; $fichero = (Get-Content C:\ProgramData\oracle.txt) ; foreach ($linea in $fichero) {$salida += $linea }; $salida = $salida.Replace(" ",""); [System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes("c:\programdata\restart-service.exe", [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($salida)) > c:\programdata\monta.ps1
powershell.exe -exec bypass -file c:\programdata\monta.ps1
del c:\programdata\monta.ps1
del c:\programdata\oracle.txt
c:\programdata\restart-service.exe
del c:\programdata\restart-service.exe

After executing the batch script by double-clicking on it, we wait a few minutes to spot the oracle.txt file which contains another file full of base64 lines, and the script monta.ps1 which contains the following content, under the directory c:\programdata\. Listing the content of the file monta.ps1 reveals the following code.

cat C:\programdata\monta.ps1
$salida = $null; $fichero = (Get-Content C:\ProgramData\oracle.txt) ; foreach ($linea in $fichero) {$salida += $linea }; $salida = $salida.Replace(" ",""); [System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes("c:\programdata\restart-service.exe", [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($salida))

Now when executing restart-service.exe we are presented with the banner Restart Oracle created by HelpDesk back in 2010.

Inspecting the execution of the executable through ProcMon64 shows that it is querying multiple things in the registry and does not show anything solid to go by.

Let’s start x64dbg, navigate to Options → Preferences, and uncheck everything except Exit Breakpoint:

By unchecking the other options, the debugging will start directly from the application’s exit point, and we will avoid going through any dll files that are loaded before the app starts. Then, we can select file → open and select the restart-service.exe to import it and start the debugging. Once imported, we right click inside the CPU view and Follow in Memory Map:

Checking the memory maps at this stage of the execution, of particular interest is the map with a size of 0000000000003000 with a type of MAP and protection set to -RW--.

Memory-mapped files allow applications to access large files without having to read or write the entire file into memory at once. Instead, the file is mapped to a region of memory that the application can read and write as if it were a regular buffer in memory. This could be a place to potentially look for hardcoded credentials

If we double-click on it, we will see the magic bytes MZ in the ASCII column that indicates that the file is a DOS MZ executable.

Let’s return to the Memory Map pane, then export the newly discovered mapped item from memory to a dump file by right-clicking on the address and selecting Dump Memory to File. Running strings on the exported file reveals some interesting information.

C:\TOOLS\Strings\strings64.exe .\restart-service_00000000001E0000.bin
 
<SNIP>
"#M
z\V
).NETFramework,Version=v4.0,Profile=Client
FrameworkDisplayName
.NET Framework 4 Client Profile
<SNIP>

Reading the output reveals that the dump contains a .NET executable. We can use De4Dot to reverse .NET executables back to the source code by dragging the restart-service_00000000001E0000.bin onto the de4dot executable.

de4dot v3.1.41592.3405
 
Detected Unknown Obfuscator (C:\Users\cybervaca\Desktop\restart-service_00000000001E0000.bin)
Cleaning C:\Users\cybervaca\Desktop\restart-service_00000000001E0000.bin
Renaming all obfuscated symbols
Saving C:\Users\cybervaca\Desktop\restart-service_00000000001E0000-cleaned.bin

Now, we can read the source code of the exported application by dragging and dropping it onto the DnSpy executable.

With the source code disclosed, we can understand that this binary is a custom-made runas.exe with the sole purpose of restarting the Oracle service using hardcoded credentials.

Graph View